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DETECTING MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP OF UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT LEGAL DECISIONS USING FUNCTION
WORDS
BY JEFFREY S. ROSENTHAL AND ALBERT H. YOON
University of Toronto
This paper uses statistical analysis of function words used in legal judg-
ments written by United States Supreme Court justices, to determine which
justices have the most variable writing style (which may indicated greater
reliance on their law clerks when writing opinions), and also the extent to
which different justices’ writing styles are distinguishable from each other.
1. Introduction. This paper describes various statistical analyses performed
on the texts of judicial opinions written by United States Supreme Court (USSC)
justices.
Our primary motivation is to attempt to use textual analysis to explore issues
of authorship. With respect to the USSC, we are interested in the extent to which
justices rely on their clerks when writing opinions. According to legal scholar
and jurist Richard A. Posner, “Americans... could not care less whether Supreme
Court justices or any other judges write their own opinions or have their clerks
write them, provided the judges decide the outcome” [Posner (1996), page 143].
While reasonable minds may disagree with Posner on either positive or norma-
tive grounds, it is clear that the content of judicial opinions matter, particularly
at the USSC. Lower courts are bound by both the holding and the reasoning of
USSC opinions, and litigants—actual and prospective—act in the shadow of these
opinions [Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979)].
The issue of judicial authorship is important from an institutional and pol-
icy perspective. At the federal level, the expansion in the number of cases has
signiﬁcantly outpaced the increase in authorized judgeships. This trend is most
pronounced at the USSC, where over the past ﬁfty years the court’s caseload
has steadily increased while the number of justices—and law clerks—has re-
mained constant. Justices are asked to handle more work with the same resources.
Given the public and Congressional scrutiny given to the selection of USSC nom-
inees [Carter (1994)], it is daunting to consider that much of the Court’s work is
done by “twenty-ﬁve-year-old law clerks fresh out of law school” [Posner (1986),
page 567].
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Given these increased demands, and heterogeneity in justices’ ability and effort,
one would expect that justices differ in how they manage their workload. Some
justices respond, as many have, by joining the “cert pool,” where justices work
collectively to evaluate which cases to grant certiorari [Ward and Weiden (2006),
page 117]. Some may delegate more of opinion writing, the primary output from
the Court, to their law clerks. The degree to which the latter has occurred remains
a topic of intense debate by journalists and scholars alike [Woodward and Arm-
strong (1979); Lazarus (1998); Toobin (2007)].
This debate has been motivated in part by the fact that justices, as Article III
judges, enjoy lifetime tenure. Critics of lifetime tenure contend that justices of-
ten serve well beyond their productive years [Garrow (2000); Calbresi and Lind-
gren (2006)]. If true, one manifestation would likely be increased delegation of
work to law clerks as justices’ ability and desire to do the work diminishes over
time. Our methodology provides a credible statistical approach to examine the re-
lationship between justices and their clerks, speciﬁcally how justices vary, both
with respect to one another and over the court of their tenure on the USSC.
Our central intuition is that the greater the delegation in the opinion-writing
process, the more heterogeneous the writing style. At the extremes, a justice who
wrote his own opinions would presumptively have a more distinct writing style
than another justice who relied heavily on his law clerks. This view is supported by
recent scholarship analyzing justices’ draft opinions where available, ﬁnding that
a justice who was more involved in the opinion-writing process produced more
textually consistent opinions than a justice who delegated more of the work to
his clerks [Wahlbeck et al. (2002), page 172]. The institutional design of USSC
clerkships provides an additional exogenous mechanism to test this hypothesis:
USSC clerkships are usually for a single term, from October through August of
the subsequent year. Accordingly, the cohort for law clerks changes in predictable
fashion, allowing an examination of justices’ writing style within and across terms.
Although this paper focuses on statistical methodology, the question of judicial
authorship is an important one in both political science and law. USSC opinions
reﬂect a principal–agent relationship between the justices and their clerks. As with
any principal–agent relationship, the degrees to which the clerks’ interests corre-
spond with the justices’ depend on their incentives and degree of oversight. But
to even approach this question requires ﬁrst a more complete understanding of
judicial authorship. While it may be possible to tackle this assignment by reading
every Supreme Court opinion, our discussions with current USSC scholars suggest
that differences in writing variability across justices may be too subtle to discern
manually. Our paper provides a more systematic approach. [In a different direc-
tion, scholars have recently taken a textual analysis approach to the USSC in the
context of oral argument; Hawes, Lin and Resnik (2009).]
For example, it is believed that within the current USSC, certain justices [e.g.,
Scalia; see Lazarus (1998), page 271] primarily write their own legal decisions,
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law clerks to do much of the writing. While anecdotes abound on these claims
[Peppers (2006); Ward and Weiden (2006)], there are few hard facts about this and
it is mostly a matter of speculation.
Weattempt toverifythis hypothesis bymeasuring thevariability of writingstyle
of the majority opinions written by various justices. We ﬁnd, using the Kennedy–
Scalia example, that Kennedy opinions have signiﬁcantly greater variability than
do those by Scalia, measured using various statistics involving the frequencies of
various function words (as described below). Furthermore, using a bootstrap ap-
proach, we conﬁrm that these differences are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. Given our assumption that greater reliance on clerks produces greater vari-
ability of writing style, this conclusion would appear to provide compelling evi-
dence that Kennedy does indeed get more writing assistance from law clerks than
does Scalia. We similarly ﬁnd that Stevens and Souter have signiﬁcantly more vari-
ability than Scalia, while Rehnquist and Breyer and Thomas have signiﬁcantly less
variability than Kennedy.
Our secondary motivation is to attempt to identify authorship, solely by use of
word frequencies. Our informal enquiries with USSC constitutional scholars indi-
cate that they do not believe they are able to do this. Nevertheless, in this paper we
consider various approaches (naive Bayes classiﬁer, linear classiﬁer), and show us-
ing a cross-validation approach that such algorithms can indeed predict authorship
in pairwise comparisons with accuracy approaching 90%. While this determina-
tion is superﬂuous for authored opinions, it does provide a clear measure of the
extent to which justices have identiﬁably distinct writing styles from one another.
Moreover, our approach has other relevant applications, such as identifying the
likely author for per curiam opinions (for which no justice is listed as the author).
Our methodology thus appears to provide useful methods both for determining
multiple authorship and for identifying the recorded authorship, solely using func-
tion words—at least for USSC decisions (and perhaps beyond). Our analysis re-
quired writing extensive software, which is freely available [Rosenthal (2009)] for
purposes of reproducing or extending our results. Further details are given herein.
1.1. Background on the United States Supreme Court. The USSC is the high-
est court in the United States, providing the ﬁnal word on all federal issues of con-
stitutional and statutory law. It has a predominantly discretionary docket, granting
certiorari only for “cases involving unsettled questions of federal constitutional or
statutory law of general interest” [Rehnquist (2001), page 238]. While the USSC
is not unique in issuing opinions or creating precedent, its position at the apex of
the judicial hierarchy ensures that practitioners, legal scholars, and law students
closely scrutinize its opinions.
Each year the Court receives thousands of petitions for certiorari (requests to
hear the case), for which it decides which cases to hear, and issue opinions. In the
2008–2009 term, for example, the Court received 8966 cert petitions, heard oral
argument for 87 cases, and issued 86 opinions [Judicial Business of the United286 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
States Courts (2009), Table A1]. These ﬁgures reﬂect a historical trend in which
the caseload demands of the Court has steadily increased.
The workload is considerable. Unlike the executive and legislative branches of
the federal government, the USSC is administratively lean. The court itself con-
sists of only nine justices. The chambers of each justice typically consist of one
secretary and four law clerks.
Justices routinely serve on the USSC well past typical retirement age or after
they vest in their pension (which usually occurs at age 65), often leaving only due
to death or illness. Perhaps in part due to the Court’s tradition of longevity and
hard work, Americans consistently rank the USSC as the most trusted branch of
government [Jamieson and Hennessy (2007)]. Justice Louis Brandeis once com-
mented, “[t]he reason the public thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme
Court is that they are almost the only people in Washington who do their own
work” [O’Brien (1986), pages 12–13].
At the same time, the USSC remains one of the least understood branches. Un-
like Congress, the USSC deliberates in private. The deliberations result in a sin-
gle public document: the opinion itself. Accordingly, the process by which the
USSC produces each opinion remains largely unknown. Prior to the 1950s, jus-
tices performed most of the substantive requirements of the job, including writing
opinions [Peppers (2006), page 208], while law clerks performed mostly admin-
istrative tasks. As the job demands increased over time, however, without a cor-
responding increase in the number of justices, justices relied more on law clerks
to prepare certiorari and oral argument memos, as well as draft and edit opinions
[Peppers (2006), page 151]. While the prestige of a Supreme Court law clerkship
is well accepted within legal circles [Kozinski (1999)], the clerks’ contribution to
their respective justices remains largely anecdotal [Peppers (2006); Ward and Wei-
den (2006); Lazarus (1998); Woodward and Armstrong (1979)]. Some accounts of
the USSC law clerks directly challenge Brandeis’s claim. Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall, when told that his view of the right to privacy conﬂicted with one of his
earlier opinions, allegedly replied, “That’s not my opinion, that’s the opinion of
[a clerk from the prior term]” [Woodward and Armstrong (1979), page 238]. Over-
all, the anecdotal evidence suggests that justices vary in their reliance on law clerks
in the drafting and editing of opinions.
1.2. Statistical analysis via function words. Stylometry, the statistical analy-
sis of texts, has a long history, including applications to the famous Shakespeare
authorship question [see, e.g., Seletsky, Huang and Henderson-Frost (2007);
Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009), though much of the investigation has involved
historical and other nonstatistical methods], the Federalist Papers [Mosteller and
Wallace (1964)], and Ronald Reagan’s radio addresses [Airoldi et al. (2006,
2007)].
One challenge with statistical textual analysis is separating those writing fea-
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TABLE 1
The 63 function words used in the present study
a, all, also, an, and, any, are, as, at, be, been, but, by, can, do, down, even, for, from, had, has, have,
her, his, if, in, into, is, it, its, may,more, must, no, not, now, of, on, one, only, or, our, so, some, such,
than, that, the, their, then, there, things, this, to, up, was, were, what, when, which, who, with, would
content. To deal with this, a number of authors [e.g., Fries (1952); Miller, New-
man and Friedman (1958); Mosteller and Wallace (1964); Airoldi et al. (2006);
Wyatt (1980); Argamon and Levitan (2005); see also the lengthy bibliography
in Mosteller and Wallace (1964)] have made extensive use of so-called function
words, that is, words such as all, have, not and than, whose usage frequencies are
thought to be largely independent of the subject matter under discussion. Previous
studies [Wyatt (1980); Argamon and Levitan (2005)] have found these function
words to be of some use, albeit limited, in determining authorship of disputed
writings. And, as summarized by Madigan et al. (2005), “The stylometry literature
has long considered function words to be topic-free in the sense that the relative
frequency with which an author uses, for example, “with,” should be the same
regardless of whether the author is describing cooking recipes or the latest news
about theoilfuturesmarket.”Inanycase,suchfunction wordsappear tobeauseful
starting point for content-independent statistical analysis.
In particular, in their study of the Federalist Papers, Mosteller and Wal-
lace [(1964), page 38, Table 2.5-2] produce a list of 70 function words, culled
for their purposes from certain earlier studies [Fries (1952); Miller, Newman and
Friedman (1958)]. This list provides the basis for our statistical analysis, though to
improve stability we eliminated the seven function words (every, my, shall, should,
upon, will, your) that occur with frequency less than 0.001 in the USSC judgments,
leaving us with 63 function words (Table 1). (We also considered adding while and
whilst, which Mosteller and Wallace also found to be very useful, but they too had
frequency less than 0.001 in the USSC judgments. In any case, our results changed
very little upon adding or removing these few words.)
Of course, it is also possible to consider larger-scale features (e.g., sentence
length, paragraph length, multi-word phrases) and smaller-scale features (e.g., fre-
quency of commas or semi-colons, or the letter ‘e’) and, indeed, our software
[Rosenthal (2009)] computes some of these quantities as well. However, we have
found that these additional quantities did not greatly improve our predictive power
(since their frequencies tend to be similar for different judgments) and, further-
more, it is subtle (due to differing scales) how best to combine such quantities
with function word frequencies into a single variability measure, so we do not use
them here. [This decision is partially reinforced by Madigan et al. (2005), who
tried 13 different feature sets for an authorship identiﬁcation problem, and found
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a different “three-letter sufﬁx” approach.] Hence, for simplicity and to allow for
“cleaner” theory, in the present study we compute using function words only.
1.3. Data acquisition. Our data consisted of the complete text of judgments
of the USSC from 1991–2009, as provided by the Cornell Law School web site
[Cornell (2009)]. For consistency, we primarily considered the majority opinions
written by the various USSC justices, though we do brieﬂy consider dissenting
opinions below as well. (While expansive, the Cornell data source occasionally
introduces transcription errors and furthermore apparently does not contain quite
every USSC opinion, e.g., those by Justice O’Connor are apparently missing. We
assume, however, that such minor limitations in the data do not signiﬁcantly bias
our results.)
Although the judgment texts were publicly available [Cornell (2009)], it was
still necessary to download all the data ﬁles from the web, convert them to simple
plain-text format, remove extraneous header and footer text, sort the judgments by
authoring justice and by court session, and index all the judgments by date written.
The number of judgments to consider, well over 1000, required writing extensive
software [Rosenthal (2009)], consisting of various C programs together with Unix
shell-scripts, to quickly and automatically perform this task.
Usingthissoftware,wedownloaded andprocessed andsorted allofthe majority
opinion judgments (and also separately the dissenting opinions) of various USSC
justices. To avoid trivialities, judgments containing fewer than 250 words were
systematically excluded. The resulting ﬁles were then used as data for all of our
statistical work below.
2. Statistical analyses of word counts. We suppose that our function words
are numbered from j = 1t oj = 63. We further suppose that a given justice has
written judgments numbered from i = 1t oi = K.L e twi be the total number
of words in judgment i,a n dl e tcij be the number of times that function word j
appears in judgment i.
2.1. Word fractions. Since judgments can differ considerably in their length,
the raw counts cij by themselves are not particularly meaningful. One approach is
to instead consider the quantities
fij = cij/wi,
representing the fraction of words in judgment i which are function word j.I f
the sample standard deviation sd(f1j,f2j,...,fKj) is much larger for one justice
than for another, this suggests that the former has a much more variable writing
style.
Unfortunately, this analysis is not entirely independent of such factors as the
length of judgments, the different justices’ different propensities to use different
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some ﬁxed unknown propensity pj for using the function word j, independently
for each word of each of their judgments. In this case, the distribution of the count
cij of reference word j in judgment i is Binomial(wi,pj),s ot h a tfij has mean pj
and variance pj(1− pj)/wi, which depend on the individual propensities pj and
judgment lengths wi. So, while we could consider calculating the sum of sample
standard deviations
V1 =
63  
j=1
sd(f1j,f2j,...,fKj),
and use that as a measure of the variability of writing style across judgments of a
given justice, such a comparison would not be entirely satisfactory since it would
be inﬂuenced by such factors as pj and wi, so it would, for example, tend to
unfairly assign smaller variability to justices who tend to write shorter decisions.
One approach to overcoming this obstacle is to adjust the fractions fij to make
them less sensitive to pj and wi. Speciﬁcally, fij − pj has mean 0 and variance
pj(1−pj)/wi, so this is also approximately true for fij −μj,w h e r e
μj =
c1j +c2j +···+cKj
w1 +w2 +···+wK
is our best estimate of pj. Hence, approximately, the quantity
rij = w
1/2
i (fij −μj)
has mean 0 and variance pj(1−pj), which is independent of the judgment length
wi, suggesting the reﬁned variability estimator
V2 =
63  
j=1
sd(r1j,r2j,...,rKj).
Since pj(1 − pj) still depends on the unknown propensity pj, we could further
reﬁne the variability estimator to
V3 =
63  
j=1
sd(q1j,q2j,...,qKj),
where now
qij =
w
1/2
i (fij −μj)
(μj(1−μj))1/2
have mean 0 and variance approximately 1, independent of both wi and pj.
However, even these reﬁnements are not entirely satisfactory, since the μj are
not perfect estimates of the propensities pj, and it is difﬁcult to accurately take
into account the additional variability from the uncertainty in the μj. In particular,290 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
if pj is quite close to zero (as it often will be), then dividing by μj might be
rather unstable, leading to unreliable results. (In the most extreme case, if μj = 0,
then dividing by μj is undeﬁned; we ﬁx this by simply omitting all terms with
μj = 0 from the sum, but this illustrates the instability inherent in V3.) So, we now
consider an alternative approach.
2.2. A chi-squared approach. Since in our case the counts cij are exact, while
estimates such as μj are inexact, this suggests that we instead use the chi-squared
statistic. Speciﬁcally, we consider the value
chisq =
K  
i=1
63  
j=0
(cij −eij)2
eij
,
where again wi is the total number of words in judgment i,a n dcij is the number
of times that function word j appears in judgment i, and now ci0 = wi − ci1 −
···−ciK is the number of words in judgment i which are not function words, and
eij = wi
 c1j +c2j +···+cKj
w1 +w2 +···+wK
 
is the expected number of times that function word j would have appeared in
judgment i under the null hypothesis that the total number c1j + c2j +···+cKj
of appearances of reference word j were each equally likely to occur in any of the
total number w1 + w2 +···+wK of words in all of the justice’s K judgments
combined.
Under the null hypothesis, the chisq statistic should follow a chi-squared dis-
tribution with (63 + 1 − 1)(K − 1) = 63(K − 1) degrees of freedom, hence with
mean 63(K − 1).( T h e“ +1” arises because of the ci0 terms.) So, dividing this
statistic by its null mean, we obtain the new statistic
V4 = chisq/df = chisq/63(K −1).
The value of chisq/df should be approximately 1 under the null hypothesis, and
larger than 1 for writing collections which exhibit greater writing style variability.
In particular, the extent to which chisq/df is larger than 1 appears to be a fairly
reliable and robust way to estimate writing style variability.
In our experiments below, we report values of each of V1, V2, V3 and V4,b u tw e
concentrate primarily on V4 since we feel it is the most stable and reliable measure
and eliminates many of the shortcomings of the other three quantities.
2.3. Variability results. We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)] to com-
pute each of the above variability statistics V1, V2, V3 and V4 (among other statis-
tics). We then applied our software to a variety of USSC justices’ judgments. The
results are in Table 2. (Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the results are for majority judg-
ments written by that justice. Also, “words/judgment” means the average number
of words per judgment considered.)SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 291
TABLE 2
Variability statistics for selected USSC justices
# judgments Words/Judgment V1 V2 V3 V4
Kennedy 147 5331 0.118 8.27 2709.1 4.12
Scalia 156 4536 0.113 7.18 2467.0 3.13
Stevens 148 5996 0.111 7.96 2856.2 3.94
Souter 143 5638 0.111 7.80 2531.0 3.77
Ginsburg 130 4712 0.114 7.49 2926.4 3.66
Thomas 140 3877 0.128 7.64 2669.4 3.55
Breyer 121 3804 0.119 7.06 2538.7 3.31
Rehnquist 127 3743 0.124 7.22 2398.5 3.22
Stevens dissent 205 3202 0.147 6.75 2251.1 2.63
Kennedy dissent 42 3546 0.148 6.49 2229.8 2.51
Scalia dissent 108 3410 0.141 6.64 2083.5 2.46
Looking at these results, we see that Kennedy does indeed have higher writing-
style variability than does Scalia, by each of the four measures, thus apparently
conﬁrming our original hypothesis (see also the next section re statistical signif-
icance). The other justices mostly fall in between these extremes, though Souter
and Stevens also have very high variability, while Breyer and Rehnquist have lower
variability.
As for the dissenting judgments, we might expect them to have much smaller
writing variability since they tend to be more focused and also more likely to be
written by the justice alone. This is indeed conﬁrmed by the measures V2, V3
and V4, but not by V1 which gets tripped up by the fact that dissents tend to be
shorter and V1 does not correct for this. So, this provides conﬁrmation that dissent
judgments tend to have more consistent writing style, and also further illustrates
why V1 is not an appropriate measure of variability. (By contrast, Thomas has
greater variability than Scalia by all measures, even though his average judgment
length is much shorter.)
REMARK. Of course, the different Vi are each on a different scale, so it is
meaningless to, for example, compare the value of V1 directly with the value of V2.
It is only meaningful to compare the same variability statistic (e.g., V4) when com-
puted for different collections of judgments.
REMARK. In all cases the value of V4 is much larger than it would be under
the null hypothesis that the function words are truly distributed uniformly and ran-
domly. For example, for Scalia, the chisq statistic is equal to 3.13 × 63 × (156 −
1) = 30,564.45; under the null hypothesis this would have the chi-squared distri-
bution with 63(156−1) = 9765 degrees of freedom, for which the value 30,564.45
corresponds to a p-value of about exp(−4834.5) which is completely negligible.292 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
So, the null hypothesis is deﬁnitively rejected. However, we still feel that chisq (or,
in particular, the related quantity V4) is the most appropriate measure of writing-
style variability in this case, even though it no longer corresponds to an actual
chi-squared distribution.
REMARK. Of course, while a larger Vi value indicates that one justice has a
more variable writing style than another, it does not directly determine whether
the justice relies more heavily on law clerks. Alternative explanations include that
the justice edits his/her clerks work more carefully, or that some clerks are better
than others at copying their justice’s writing style, or that some justices naturally
have a more variable writing style even when writing entirely on their own. So,
we view the Vi measurements as one window into the reliance of justices on their
clerks, but not a completely deﬁnitive one. This issue is considered further in the
next section.
REMARK.V a l u e s o f chisq statisticscanbelessstable/usefulwhenmanyofthe
expected cell counts are very close to zero. Despite having already eliminated from
consideration those function words which have very low frequency in the USSC
judgments, and those USSC judgments which are extremely short, it is still true
that in the judgments we consider, 4.48% of the expected cell counts (mean 28.91,
median 9.96) and 7.55% of the observed cell counts (mean 28.91, median 10.00)
are less than one (Figure 1). It may be possible to correct for this, for example,
with Yates’ correction, but this is not without difﬁculties, as it may over-correct
and also is usually used only for 2 × 2 tables. As a check, we experimented with
recomputing our V4 statistic omitting all cells with very small expected count,
and found that this slightly reduced all the V4 values but in a consistent way, and
FIG.1 . Expected (top) and observed (bottom) cell count frequencies for all 70,056 cells corre-
sponding to all 1112 of the USSC 1991–2009 judgments considered above.SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 293
relevant comparisons such as bootstrap tests of signiﬁcance (see next section) were
virtually unchanged. So, overall we do not expect this small-cell issue to be a
signiﬁcant problem, and we leave the deﬁnition of V4 as above.
3. Bootstrap test of signiﬁcance. The question remains whether the results
from the previous section (e.g., that Kennedy has larger writing variability than
Scalia)are theresult ofmerechance orareactually illustrative ofdifferent amounts
of writing-style variability. Since we have already rejected the null hypothesis (the
null hypothesis that the function words are truly distributed uniformly and ran-
domly), the quantity V4 no longer follows a chi-squared distribution, so no simple
analytic test of statistical signiﬁcance is available.
So,totestsigniﬁcance,weperformabootstraptest.Speciﬁcally,foreachjustice
weshallselectcases a1,a2,...,a100 uniformlyatrandom(withrepetition allowed,
though this could also be done without repetition). For each such choice of 100
cases, we shall compute the variability measure V4 as above. We shall repeat this
1000 times for each justice, thus giving a list of 1000 different possible values
of V4, depending on which list of 100 cases was randomly selected.
If we do this for two different justices, say, for Kennedy and for Scalia, then
this gives us 1000 × 1000 = 1,000,000 pairs of V4 values. We then simply count
the fraction of pairs under which the V4 for Kennedy is larger than the V4 for
Scalia, to give us an estimate of the probability that V4 for Kennedy is larger than
V4 for Scalia, for a randomly-chosen selection of their judgments. We also use the
pairs to estimate the distribution function for the difference of the V4 variability for
Kennedy, minus that for Scalia, and then use this estimated distribution function to
compute the 95% conﬁdence interval for the difference of V4 for Kennedy minus
that for Scalia. If this conﬁdence interval is entirely positive, this indicates that
Kennedy judgments have a more variable writing style than Scalia judgments, and
that this conclusion is robust and statistically signiﬁcant, rather than merely the
result of chance variation.
Note that this bootstrap setup has the additional advantage that, since the same
number of judgments (100) are chosen for each justice at each step, any concerns
about comparing different numbers of judgments are avoided.
3.1. Variability bootstrap results. We developed software [Rosenthal (2009)]
to compare the V4 bootstrap values as above, using 1000 bootstrap samples each of
size 100. We then ran this software to compare Kennedy and Scalia in this manner,
obtaining the following results:
mean(Kennedy) mean(Scalia) P(Kennedy > Scalia) 95% CI for Kennedy − Scalia
4.06 3.08 0.99996 (0.48, 1.51)
That is, this bootstrap test determines that the probability that a randomly-selected
sample of Kennedy’s writings is more variable than a randomly-selected sample of294 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
Scalia’swritingsisover99.99%,anearcertainty.Furthermore,the95%conﬁdence
interval (0.48, 1.51) for the difference in variabilities is entirely positive. So, we
can conclude with conﬁdence that, based on the V4 chi-squared test, Kennedy’s
writings have more variable writing style than Scalia’s.
Similarly, when comparing Souter to Scalia, we obtain the following:
mean(Souter) mean(Scalia) P(Souter > Scalia) 95% CI for Souter − Scalia
3.72 3.07 0.995 (0.15, 1.20)
Or, comparing Kennedy’s majority opinions to Kennedy’s dissents, we obtain the
following:
mean(majority) mean(dissent) P(majority > dissent) 95% CI for majority − dissent
4.06 2.44 1.00 (1.14, 2.13)
Or, comparing Scalia’s majority opinions to Scalia’s dissents, we obtain the fol-
lowing:
mean(majority) mean(dissent) P(majority > dissent) 95% CI for majority − dissent
3.08 2.43 0.9997 (0.29, 1.01)
Thus, we conclude with conﬁdence that, as expected, both Kennedy’s and Souter’s
majority opinion writing are more variable than that of Scalia, and, furthermore,
Kennedy’s majority opinion writing is more variable than his dissent opinion writ-
ing (and similarly for Scalia).
Similarly, we can compare other justices to Scalia, as follows:
mean(Stevens) mean(Scalia) P(Stevens > Scalia) 95% CI for Stevens − Scalia
3.86 3.08 0.998 (0.25, 1.34)
mean(Ginsburg) mean(Scalia) P(Ginsburg > Scalia) 95% CI for Ginsburg − Scalia
3.59 3.07 0.988 (0.07, 0.99)
mean(Thomas) mean(Scalia) P(Thomas > Scalia) 95% CI for Thomas − Scalia
3.48 3.08 0.972 (−0.01, 0.82)
Thus, we can conclude that in addition to Kennedy and Souter, each of Stevens
and Ginsburg also has greater writing variability than does Scalia, while Thomas
may have greater writing variability than does Scalia but that assertion is not
completely established. [The conclusion about Stevens may be surprising, since
Stevens also has a reputation for doing his own writing; see Domnarski (1996),
page 31. So, this result may indicate that Stevens actually relied on clerks more
than is generally believed, though of course this evidence is not completely deﬁni-
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In the other direction, we conclude that in addition to Scalia, also Rehn-
quist, Breyer and Thomas each have statistically signiﬁcantly less variability than
Kennedy, while Ginsburg does not:
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Rehnquist) P(Kennedy > Rehnquist) Kennedy − Rehnquist
4.06 3.17 0.9998 (0.37, 1.43)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Breyer) P(Kennedy > Breyer) Kennedy − Breyer
4.05 3.25 0.995 (0.19, 1.42)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Thomas) P(Kennedy > Thomas) Kennedy − Thomas
4.06 3.48 0.981 (0.03, 1.15)
95% CI for
mean(Kennedy) mean(Ginsburg) P(Kennedy > Ginsburg) Kennedy − Ginsburg
4.06 3.57 0.948 (−0.10, 1.06)
3.2. Within-justice comparisons. It is possible to use this same V4 bootstrap
approach to compare different collections of judgments by the same justice.
For example, as justices age, their writings might get less variable (since they
develop a more consistent style) or more variable (if they come to rely more on
their law clerks). To test this, we perform V4 bootstrap tests, as above, except
now comparing a justice’s majority opinions from the 1990s decade, to the same
justice’s opinions from the 2000s decade. Our results are in Table 3.
Looking attheseresults,thereisnoclear pattern. Noneofthedecade differences
are statistically signiﬁcant. Rehnquist is nearly signiﬁcantly more variable in the
TABLE 3
Bootstrap results comparing the decades 1990s and 2000s
Justice mean(1990s) mean(2000s) P(1990s < 2000s) 95% CI for 2000s − 1990s
Kennedy 3.78 4.15 0.875 (−0.27, 0.96)
Scalia 2.96 3.08 0.753 (−0.25, 0.47)
Souter 3.73 3.49 0.189 (−0.79, 0.27)
Stevens 3.78 3.82 0.539 (−0.57, 0.66)
Breyer 3.37 3.05 0.138 (−0.86, 0.28)
Ginsburg 3.30 3.69 0.948 (−0.08, 0.86)
Thomas 3.36 3.47 0.701 (−0.29, 0.49)
Rehnquist 3.20 2.92 0.050 (−0.64, 0.06)296 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
TABLE 4
Bootstrap results comparing the ﬁrst and second halves of court sessions
Justice mean(ﬁrst) mean(second) P(ﬁrst < second) 95% CI for second − ﬁrst
Kennedy 3.68 4.25 0.964 (−0.05, 1.21)
Scalia 3.04 3.05 0.521 (−0.40, 0.41)
Souter 3.39 3.91 0.955 (−0.08, 1.08)
Stevens 4.04 3.61 0.094 (−1.07, 0.20)
Breyer 3.15 3.21 0.602 (−0.49, 0.59)
Ginsburg 3.57 3.47 0.340 (−0.55, 0.35)
Thomas 3.42 3.44 0.530 (−0.38, 0.41)
Rehnquist 3.01 3.28 0.935 (−0.08, 0.62)
1990s than the 2000s, and Ginsburg is nearly signiﬁcantly more variable in the
2000s than the 1990s, but since this does not conform to any obvious interpretation
or “story,” we are inclined to regard these slight differences as mere chance events.
Another way to compare a justice’s writing is to look at those judgments which
were in the ﬁrst half of a session (i.e., September through March) versus those
judgments in the second half (i.e., April through August). The reason why judg-
ments early in a session may appear different from those later in a session is be-
cause law clerks rotate annually; thus, writing variability over the course of a ses-
sion may increase if a given justice delegates more work to his clerks, or may
diminish if clerks better learn the preferences of their justice. That is, increasing
variability may indicate a justice’s increased trust, and therefore increased delega-
tion or lower oversight to the clerk; conversely, decreasing variability could reﬂect
increased understanding by the clerks of their justice’s preferred writing style.
Our results for this comparison are in Table 4.
This time, it appears that Kennedy, Souter and Rehnquist are somewhat more
variable in the second half of court sessions, which is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that they let their clerks write more opinions once they have more work ex-
perience. Meanwhile, Stevens leans slightly in the opposite direction, with more
variability in the ﬁrst half of court sessions. However, none of these results are
statistically signiﬁcant, so we refrain from drawing clear conclusions from them.
4. Further investigation of the “V4” statistic. Since the “V4” quantity is
central to our conclusions about text variability and multiple authorship, it seems
appropriate to better understand the performance of this quantity in other circum-
stances, as we do now.
4.1. Randomly-generated text. As a simple ﬁrst experiment, we randomly
generated 200 pseudo-documents each consisting of 2000 independent randomly-
generated words. (Speciﬁcally, each word was chosen to be a nonfunction word
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probability 30%.) For such randomly-generated text, the V4 statistic should ap-
proximately equal 1. In fact, we repeated this experiment 10 times, obtaining
a mean V4 value of 1.004622, with a standard deviation of 0.01701969, consis-
tent with having a true mean value of 1.
4.2. Historical trend. It is generally believed that USSC justices rely more
on their clerks in the modern era than they did in earlier times [Ward and Wei-
den (2006); Peppers (2006)]. If so, and if larger V4 values are indeed a good indi-
cator of increased authorship, then V4 values should be generally increasing with
time.
To test this, we extended our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to also download
USSC cases from the Justia.com web site [Justia (2009) ] ,a n du s e dt h i st oa n a l y z e
cases from previous eras. We then computed the V4 score for all cases, by all
justices, on a decade-by-decade basis from 1850 onward (i.e., for all cases decided
in 1850–1859, and for all cases decided in 1860–1869 and so on). The results,
plotted against decade midpoint together with a line of best ﬁt, were as follows
(Figure 2).
This graph shows that the V4 scores have a general trend upward, increasing
by just over 0.005 per decade (and this increase is statistically signiﬁcant, p =
0.0105). This upward trend is accelerated in the modern era (1950–2009) to 0.020
per decade (p = 0.0087), corresponding to the period of increasing clerk activity
[Peppers (2006)]. These observations are consistent with the supposition that V4
scores increase with increased delegation of authorship, and that this delegation
(through the greater reliance on law clerks) has increased over the years.
4.3. Combiningjustices. AnotherwaytotestwhethertheV4 statisticincreases
with multiple authorship is to combine various collections of judgments together
in ways which would appear to increase the total number of authors, and see if
the V4 scores rise. We select judgments that we believe to be homogeneous in
their authorship, namely, majority judgments of Scalia, Rehnquist and Breyer, and
dissenting judgments of Scalia and Kennedy. Our results are in Table 5.
FIG.2 . Decade-by-decade USSC judgment average V4 scores.298 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
TABLE 5
Variability statistics when combining different justices together
# judgments V4
Scalia 156 3.13
Rehnquist 127 3.22
Breyer 121 3.31
Scalia + Rehnquist 283 3.29
Scalia + Breyer 277 3.44
Rehnquist + Breyer 248 3.49
Scalia + Rehnquist + Breyer 404 3.46
Scalia dissent 108 2.46
Kennedy dissent 42 2.51
Scalia dissent + Kennedy dissent 150 2.56
This table shows that, while the effect is not overwhelming, nevertheless, there
is a modest increase in the values of V4 when two or three different justices (each
believed to author their own judgments) are combined together, as compared to
the V4 scores for individual justices. (Furthermore, this effect appears to be rea-
sonably robust to subselection. For example, we divided the Rehnquist and Breyer
opinions into two subcollections and measured the V4 score for the four possible
pairings, obtaining values of 3.37, 3.43, 3.52 and 3.60, all signiﬁcantly more than
the individual V4 scores of 3.13 and 3.22.) Thus, we believe that this provides
modest further support for the hypothesis that increased V4 scores corresponding
to additional authors.
4.4. Essays of known authorship. Yet another way to test whether the V4
statistic increases with multiple authorship is to take documents of known author-
ship outside the judicial realm (where clerks are not a factor) and combine them in
different ways.
We considered the following historical essays: Walden by H. D. Thoreau (here-
after “Walden”); The Communist Manifesto by K. Marx and F. Engels, in English
translation (“Manifest”); On the Origin of Species by C. Darwin (“Species”); and
On Liberty by J. S. Mill (“Liberty”). We divided Walden and Liberty into discrete
2000-word chunks (discarding any leftover words), divided Manifest into discrete
1000-word chunks (since it is shorter), and left Species as the 15 separate chap-
ters in which it was written. We then tried combining them in different ways. Our
results are in Table 6.
Once again, we see clear evidence that combining multiple authors leads to
larger V4 scores, consistent with the hypothesis that larger V4 scores indicate ad-
ditional authors. Indeed, in every case, the combined V4 is larger than any of the
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TABLE 6
Variability statistics when combining different essays together
# units V4
Liberty 23 1.799
Manifest 17 1.814
Walden 57 2.255
Species 16 2.999
Liberty + Manifest 40 2.412
Liberty + Walden 80 2.595
Liberty + Species 39 3.830
Manifest + Walden 74 2.548
Manifest + Species 33 3.152
Walden + Species 73 3.793
Liberty + Manifest + Walden 97 2.737
Liberty + Manifest + Walden + Species 113 3.580
Again, this ﬁnding is fairly robust to subsampling. For example, considering
just units #1–9 of each collection (denoted by “9”), we obtain in Table 7.
Even with this subsampling, the combined collections always have larger V4
scores than the individual collections, usually substantially so. Also, the results
for the subsampled collections are generally quite similar to the corresponding
results for the full collections (though Walden9 is rather less variable than Walden
for some reason), thus conﬁrming that V4 is largely unaffected by the size of a
collection but rather concentrates on the writing variability itself.
TABLE 7
Variability statistics when combining different essays
together and subsampling
# units V4
Liberty9 9 1.717
Manifest9 9 1.735
Walden9 9 1.760
Species9 9 3.240
Liberty9 + Manifest9 18 2.388
Liberty9 + Walden9 18 2.133
Liberty9 + Species9 18 3.873
Manifest9 + Walden9 18 2.568
Manifest9 + Species9 18 3.262
Walden9 + Species9 18 3.847300 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
4.5. Fictional novels. For completeness, we also consider some famous his-
torical ﬁctional novels (www.gutenberg.org), namely: Oliver Twist,b yC .D i c k e n s
(hereafter “Oliver”), The Three Musketeers by A. Dumas (“Three”), Pride and
Prejudice by J. Austen (“Pride”), A Study in Scarlet by A. C. Doyle (“Scarlet”),
and Alice in Wonderland by L. Caroll (“Alice”). Each novel was chopped into
2000-word units (again discarding any leftover). The results are in Table 8.
Once again, the V4 scores for the combined collections are larger than the indi-
vidual V4 scores (with one exception: Oliver + Scarlet), sometimes substantially
so. Of course, it could be argued that ﬁctional writing is more free-form and thus
has different stylometric properties from such serious and formal writing as USSC
judgments. Nevertheless, these results do provide some sort of further support to
the hypothesis that larger V4 scores indicate additional authors.
In the interests of fair reporting, we note that we also experimented brieﬂy with
the novel War and Peace by L. Tolstoy, broken up into 281 different 2000-word
chunks. We found that this collection had a surprisingly high V4 score, 2.675,
which did not signiﬁcantly increase (in fact, it sometimes even decreased) when
combined with other collections. So, these results went against the hypothesis that
additional authors always leads to larger V4 scores, perhaps due to the unusually
high variability of this novel itself.
Despite this caveat, overall we feel that the results of this section provide mod-
est additional support for the use of the V4 statistic when considering issues of
multiple authorship.
TABLE 8
Variability statistics when combining different ﬁctional
novels together
# units V4
Pride 60 1.730
Alice 13 1.815
Oliver 78 1.847
Scarlet 21 2.041
Three 114 2.058
Pride + Alice 73 2.233
Pride + Oliver 138 2.326
Pride + Scarlet 81 2.160
Pride + Three 174 2.310
Alice + Oliver 91 2.025
Alice + Scarlet 34 2.388
Alice + Three 127 2.306
Oliver + Scarlet 99 1.949
Oliver + Three 192 2.191
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5. Authorship identiﬁcation. A related question is whether it is possible to
identify which justice is the (recorded) author of a judgment, based only on the
writing style. We posed this question to a small number of USSC constitutional
scholars. The consensus was that while they could perhaps identify authorship
based on the case name or known passages, they could not do so by writing style
alone. We now consider the extent to which this identiﬁcation can be done by
appropriate computer algorithms. This question is thus similar in spirit to the
Shakespeare authorship question [Seletsky, Huang and Henderson-Frost (2007);
Burns (2006); Wikipedia (2009)], and also to the Federalist Papers authorship
question [Mosteller and Wallace (1964)] and the Reagan radio address analysis
[Airoldi et al. (2006); Airoldi, Fienberg and Skinner (2007)]. Of course, there is
one important difference here: in most instances the recorded authorship of USSC
judgments is known. However, we still view this as a useful test of the extent to
which different USSC justices have identiﬁably distinct writing styles.
We shall consider both naive Bayes classiﬁers and linear classiﬁers, and shall
see that each performs quite well at this task, achieving success rates as high
as 90%. (Other possible approaches include neural networks, support vector ma-
chines, etc., but for simplicity we do not consider them here.)
In each case, we shall consider a particular pair of justices (say, Justices A
and B). We shall consider the collection of all USSC judgments whose recorded
author is either A or B, and shall partition this collection into a disjoint training
set and testing set. Using only the training set, we develop a model for classifying
judgments as being authored by A or B. We then test to see if our model classiﬁes
authorship correctly on the testing set.
5.1. Naive Bayes classiﬁer. We begin with a naive Bayes classiﬁer. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that conditioned on the recorded author being Justice A,
the conditional distribution of the fraction fj of function word j appearing in the
judgment is normally distributed. (Of course, the normal distribution is not the
only choice here, and the “true” distribution is presumably a rather complicated
mixture, over the total number of words, of multinomial distributions normalized
by the total number of words in each judgment. But the normal distribution appears
to be a good enough approximation for our purposes.) We further assume that the
corresponding mean and variance are given by the sample mean and variance of
all judgments by Justice A in the training set. In addition, we assume (since we are
being “naive”) that these different fractions fj (over different function words j)
are all conditionally independent.
Together with the uniform prior distribution on whether the author is Justice A
or B, this gives the log-likelihood for a given judgment being authored by Jus-
tice A, namely,
loglike(A) = C −
63  
j=1
 1
2
log(vj)+(fj −mj)2/2vj
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for some constant C,w h e r efj is the fraction of words which are reference word j
in the test judgment under consideration, and where mj and vj are the sample
mean and variance of the fraction of words which are reference word j, over all
judgments in the training set authored by A.
Similarly, we can compute loglike(B). The model then classiﬁes the test judg-
ment as being authored by A if loglike(A) > loglike(B), otherwise it classiﬁes it
as being authored by B.
5.2. Linear classiﬁer. Another approach is a linear classiﬁer. Speciﬁcally,
let T be a training set consisting of various judgments by A or B, with |T |=n.
We consider the linear regression model
Y = xβ +ε,
where ε is an n × 1 vector of independent zero-mean errors. Here Y is an n × 1
vector of ±1, which equals −1 for each judgment in the training set authored by A,
or +1 for each judgment in the training set authored by B.A l s o ,x is the n × 64
matrix given by
x =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
1 f1,1 f1,2 ... f1,63
1 f2,1 f2,2 ... f2,63
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
1 fn,1 fn,2 ... fn,63
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
,
where fi,j is the fraction of words in judgment i (in the training set) which are
function word j. For this model, the usual least-squares estimate for β (which
corresponds to the MLE if the εi are assumed to be iid normal) is given by
ˆ β = (xTx)−1xTY.
Once we have this estimate ˆ β = ( ˆ β0, ˆ β1,..., ˆ βn), then given a fresh test judg-
ment having function word fractions g1,g2,...,g63, we can compute the linear ﬁt
value
  = ˆ β0 +
63  
j=1
ˆ βjgj.
Then, if  <0, we classify the test judgment as being authored by A, otherwise we
classify it as being authored by B.
Below we shall consider both the linear classiﬁer and the naive Bayes classiﬁer.
We shall see that, generally speaking, the linear classiﬁer outperforms the naive
Bayes classiﬁer, sometimes signiﬁcantly so.
5.3. Testing accuracy via cross-validation. To test the accuracy of our model,
weuse leave-one-out cross-validation. That is, for each judgment by either A or B,
we consider that one judgment be the test set, with all other judgments by either A
or B comprising the training set. We then see whether or not our model classiﬁes
the test judgment correctly. Finally, we count the number of correct classiﬁcations,
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5.3.1. Results: Naive Bayes classiﬁer. We ran software [Rosenthal (2009)] to
perform the cross-validation test using the naive Bayes classiﬁer, for various pairs
of justices A and B. Our results are in Table 9.
We see from these results that our naive Bayes classiﬁer performs fairly well on
majority opinions, often achieving a success rate over 80%. (This is fairly consis-
tent across all pairings, not just those shown in Table 9; in particular, the success
rate for majority opinions is over 70% for all 8×7
2 = 28 possible pairings except for
ﬁve: Scalia–Thomas, Souter–Stevens, Rehnquist–Stevens, Stevens–Thomas and
Rehnquist–Thomas.) This appears to be quite a good performance, especially con-
sidering the minimal assumptions that have gone into the model. (Presumably a
more sophisticated model could achieve even higher success rate.) So, we see this
as evidence that USSC judgment authors can indeed be distinguished by their writ-
ing style, in fact just by the pattern of fractions of function words used.
We also note that there is some variability concerning which justices’ writing
styles are most easily distinguished. For example, Rehnquist and Breyer are appar-
ently relatively easy to distinguish from one another, while Rehnquist and Thomas
are rather more difﬁcult.
The algorithm does not perform as well on the dissenting opinions, presumably
because they tend to be shorter and thus less clearly representative of their author’s
writing style. In fact, when comparing dissent to majority opinions, the algorithm
tends to classify too many judgments as being from the majority collection, and
this weakness remains whether the majority and minority collections are from the
same justice or from two different justices.
TABLE 9
Authorship identiﬁcation results using the naive Bayes classiﬁer
Justice A Justice B success(A) success(B)
Scalia Kennedy 133/156 = 0.853 129/147 = 0.878
Scalia Souter 132/156 = 0.846 119/143 = 0.832
Scalia Stevens 130/156 = 0.833 120/148 = 0.811
Scalia Rehnquist 139/156 = 0.891 101/127 = 0.795
Kennedy Souter 139/147 = 0.946 121/143 = 0.846
Kennedy Stevens 122/147 = 0.830 113/148 = 0.764
Kennedy Rehnquist 124/147 = 0.844 97/127 = 0.764
Souter Stevens 118/143 = 0.825 124/148 = 0.838
Rehnquist Breyer 111/127 = 0.874 105/121 = 0.868
Rehnquist Stevens 76/127 = 0.598 113/148 = 0.764
Rehnquist Thomas 76/127 = 0.598 94/140 = 0.671
Scalia Scalia dissent 140/156 = 0.897 72/108 = 0.667
Stevens Stevens dissent 122/148 = 0.824 124/205 = 0.605
Scalia Stevens dissent 141/156 = 0.904 118/205 = 0.576304 J. S. ROSENTHAL AND A. H. YOON
FIG.3 . Simpleillustrativelikelihood functions forhypotheticaljustices A(solidline)andB(dashed
line), for which about 70% of judgments would be classiﬁed as A’s regardless of which distribution
they came from.
REMARK. Our results above show some asymmetries, for example, there is
much greater success distinguishing Stevens’ opinions from Rehnquist’s (0.764)
than vice-versa (0.598). This may seem counterintuitive but it provides no con-
tradiction. For a simple illustration, if there were just one function word, and A’s
function word distribution had mean 5 and standard deviation 1, while B’s func-
tion word distribution had mean 5 and standard deviation 1.1, then A’s likelihood
function would usually be above B’s (Figure 3), and about 70% of opinions would
be classiﬁed as A’s regardless of which distribution they came from.
5.3.2. Results: Linear classiﬁer. We also ran software [Rosenthal (2009)] to
perform the cross-validation test using a linear classiﬁer, again for various pairs of
justices A and B. Our results are in Table 10.
TABLE 10
Authorship identiﬁcation results using the linear classiﬁer
Justice A Justice B success(A) success(B)
Scalia Kennedy 135/156 = 0.865 135/147 = 0.918
Scalia Souter 137/156 = 0.878 123/143 = 0.860
Scalia Stevens 125/156 = 0.801 126/148 = 0.851
Scalia Rehnquist 137/156 = 0.878 108/127 = 0.850
Kennedy Souter 138/147 = 0.939 132/143 = 0.923
Kennedy Stevens 135/147 = 0.918 128/148 = 0.865
Kennedy Rehnquist 133/147 = 0.905 110/127 = 0.866
Souter Stevens 122/143 = 0.853 131/148 = 0.885
Rehnquist Breyer 121/127 = 0.953 110/121 = 0.909
Rehnquist Stevens 88/127 = 0.693 118/148 = 0.797
Rehnquist Thomas 77/127 = 0.606 92/140 = 0.657
Scalia Scalia dissent 131/156 = 0.840 77/108 = 0.713
Stevens Stevens dissent 99/148 = 0.669 151/205 = 0.737
Scalia Stevens dissent 125/156 = 0.801 164/205 = 0.800SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 305
Comparing these results with those from the previous subsection shows that
the linear classiﬁer performs even better than the naive Bayes classiﬁer, with suc-
cess rates often close to 90%. (This is again fairly consistent across all pairings;
in particular, the success rate is above 80% for all possible majority opinion pair-
ings with the exception of Rehnquist–Stevens and those involving Thomas.) This
provides further, even stronger evidence that it is indeed possible to distinguish
between different USSC justices’ judgments solely on the basis of writing style.
Once again, there is some variability concerning which justices’ writing styles
are most easily distinguished. For example, success rates for distinguishing Rehn-
quist from Breyer are over 90%, while those for distinguishing Rehnquist and
Thomas are in the 60s.
On dissenting opinions, the linear classiﬁer appears to be less prone to incor-
rectly classifying almost all judgments as being from the majority opinion col-
lection. Rather, it is better balanced between the two collections. However, it still
ﬁnds the dissenting opinions to be challenging, with success rates ranging from
84% (quite good) down to 67% (rather poor).
REMARK. It is possible to examine the regression coefﬁcients to see which
words are most used to distinguish justices. For example, when comparing
Kennedy to Scalia, the regression coefﬁcient for the function word now is −540,
while that forsuchis +204. And, indeed, Kennedy’s judgments use now over twice
as frequently as Scalia’s, but use such less than half as frequently.
5.4. Outlier detection. Finally, we brieﬂy note that the above naive Bayes ap-
proach can easily be adapted to the issue of outlier detection. Suppose a collection
of n judgments is given, and it is believed that they were all written by the same au-
thor with one exception (e.g., perhaps a justice allowed his clerks to write just one
of his opinions each term, something we may explore more fully in separate work).
That is, there are n − 1 “decoy” judgments all written by the same author, plus
one unknown “test” judgment having different authorship. In this case, for each
individual judgment, we proceed by excluding that judgment, computing sample
means mj and variances vj for each reference word j based on the other n − 1
judgments, and then computing a log-likelihood for the individual judgment as
in (1). The higher this log-likelihood value, the better the individual judgment “ﬁts
in” with all the other judgments. We can then rank all the individual judgments
from 1 to n in terms of their log-likelihood scores, from smallest log-likelihood
(i.e., most likely to be the outlier) to largest log-likelihood (i.e., least likely to be
the outlier).
To score the performance of such outlier detection, suppose our algorithm gives
the true outlier a rank of i.I fi = 1, the algorithm has performed perfectly, while if
i = n, then the algorithm has completely failed. So, we can convert this to a score
from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), by the simple linear transformation
score =
n−i
n−1
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TABLE 11
Outlier detection results
Test collection Decoy collection Average score
Scalia Three 99.44
Three Scalia 99.87
Scalia Volume 8 58.55
Volume 8 Scalia 99.71
Scalia Kennedy 64.41
Kennedy Scalia 65.72
Scalia Rehnquist 57.75
Rehnquist Scalia 71.11
To test this algorithm, we averaged the score (2) over a collection of test judg-
ments, to compute a ﬁnal average score between 0 (worst) and 100 (best). We used
the following collections: Scalia’s 156 judgments considered herein; Kennedy’s
147 judgments considered herein; Rehnquist’s 127 judgments considered herein;
the 24 judgments from Volume 8 (1807–1808) of the USSC (obtained by extend-
ing our software [Rosenthal (2009)] to download older USSC judgments from the
Justia (2009) web site); and the 114 segments of The Three Musketeers (“Three”)
as discussed in Section 4.5. Our results are in Table 11.
We see that the algorithm can very easily distinguish the ﬁctional work The
Three Musketeers from such serious writings as Scalia’s USSC judgments. Fur-
thermore, it can easily pick out an old Volume 8 judgments from a sea of modern
Scalia judgments. Interestingly, this last result is highly asymmetric (even more so
than that suggested by Figure 3), that is, the algorithm is much worse at picking
out a single Scalia judgment from a sea of Volume 8 judgments. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, the algorithm has less success picking out a single Scalia judgment from
a sea of Kennedy judgments, or vice versa. Indeed, its scores, near 65, are only
moderately better than pure chance guessing (which would produce an average
score of 50). For Scalia versus Rehnquist—two justices who apparently write their
own opinions—the scores are not much better. This illustrates that it is easier to
identify judgment authorship when given two large collections, than when given a
single large collection with just one outlier.
6. Summary. In this paper we have presented methodology and software for
investigationsofUSSCjudgmentsbyusingstatisticalpropertiesoffunctionwords.
First, we have investigated the variability of writing style over various collec-
tions of judgments, in particular, of majority decisions written by different justices.
We have seen that it is possible to uncover statistically signiﬁcant evidence that
one USSC justice (e.g., Kennedy) has greater writing-style variability than another
justice (e.g., Scalia), which may indicate that the ﬁrst justice relies on law clerk
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Second, we have investigated the extent to which unknown authorship of USSC
judgments can be determined based solely on function word statistics. We have
seen that both naive Bayes classiﬁers and linear classiﬁers perform fairly well at
this task, achieving cross-validation success rates approaching 90%. While author-
ship is typically known for all USSC opinions, our approach reveals that justices—
even with contributions by clerks—have writing styles which are distinguishable
from one another. (In a different direction, one could perhaps use function words
to identify authorship for the handful of per curiam decisions in which the Court
does not reveal authorship, though we do not pursue that here.)
Of course, our approach—or any textual analysis—can provide only circum-
stantial evidence of collaborative authorship, not deﬁnitive proof. A low V4 score
can reﬂect that a justice does her own writing, that the justice closely edits her
clerks’ work, or that the clerks are all highly effective at mimicking their justices’
writing style; these states of the world are observationally equivalent. However, we
do believe that our results provide compelling evidence that justices over time are
indeed relying more on their law clerks, and that justices vary considerably from
one another in this regard.
Overall, we hope that the methodology and software [Rosenthal (2009)] pre-
sented here will provide useful insights into USSC writings, as well as a helpful
starting point for other statistical investigations into other bodies of writing in other
contexts.
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